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Abstract
We study a model in which households are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic employment
shocks, firms set prices subject to nominal rigidities, and the labor market is characterized by match-
ing frictions and by downward inflexible wages. We introduce heterogeneity in search eﬃciency that
arises either upon job loss or during an unemployment spell. Higher risk of job loss and worsening job
finding prospects during unemployment depress goods demand because of a precautionary savings
motive amongst employed households. Lower goods demand produces a decline in job vacancies and
the ensuing drop in the job finding rate in turn triggers higher precautionary saving setting in motion
an amplification mechanism. The amplification mechanism is absent from standard macroeconomic
models and depends on the combination of incomplete financial markets and frictional goods and
labor markets. The model can account for key features of the Great Recession in response to the ob-
served changes in the job separation rate and an increase in search eﬃciency heterogeneity estimated
from the matching function.
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1 Introduction
The U.S. and many other Western economies have still not fully recovered from the Great Recession,
the longest and deepest recession since the 1930’s. The U.S. labor market outcomes during the Great
Recession have been particularly grave and have involved not only a persistent rise in the level of unem-
ployment, but also a surge in the share of longer-term unemployed workers. This paper puts forward a
macroeconomic theory of how such labor market weaknesses can motivate a decline in aggregate demand
and how this may produce an amplification mechanism. In particular, we show that a combination of
frictions in goods, labor and financial markets, fosters an environment in which changes in job uncer-
tainty impact on goods demand due to precautionary savings against idiosyncratic employment risk and
where such changes in goods demand are transmitted to the supply side resulting in changes in labor
demand that feed back to the demand side. We apply this theory to U.S. data for the Great Recession
and argue it may have been partly responsible for the severity of the Great Recession.
We consider a model in which households face job loss risk during employment and uncertain job
finding prospects during unemployment. Households cannot purchase unemployment insurance con-
tracts and therefore have to rely on government provided unemployment benefits and private savings
for consumption smoothing. In such an incomplete markets setting, changes in the risk of job loss or
in the probability of finding a new job during unemployment impact on aggregate demand through
employed households precautionary savings. As a result, the decline in aggregate demand that can
derive from worsening labor market conditions may be far larger than the income loss of the households
that actually suﬀer a job loss.1 We embed this mechanism in a macro model with downward inflexible
real wages and in which variations in aggregate demand are transmitted to the supply side because of
nominal rigidities in price setting. The introduction of nominal rigidities is a simple way of allowing fluc-
tuations in aggregate demand to impact on equilibrium allocations while the assumption of downward
rigid wages is motivated by the lack of a decline in real wages in the U.S. during the Great Recession
despite the large increase in the number of job seekers as indicated by unemployment statistics.
We adopt a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides style matching framework of the labor market. In order
to address the surge in long-term unemployment observed in the U.S. during the Great Recession, we
extend the standard matching model with heterogeneity across workers in their job search eﬃciency.
Specifically, we assume that unemployed workers diﬀer in their expected unemployment durations and
1Carroll and Dunn (1997) and Carroll, Dynan and Krane (2004) also stress the impact of labor market uncertainties
on demand due to precautionary savings.
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that these diﬀerences emerge either upon job loss or during an unemployment spell (which introduces
negative duration dependence).2 The heterogeneity in search eﬃciency allows us to address the surge
in longer term unemployment but is also important for the amplification mechanism because lower
search eﬃciency during unemployment increases the precautionary savings motive amongst the currently
employed workers.
We formalize these ideas in an Aiyagari-Huggett-type incomplete markets model with uninsurable
idiosyncratic employment and job finding risks and with multiple unemployment states. Firms are
monopolistically competitive and face quadratic costs of changing nominal prices.3 A fiscal authority
provides unemployment benefits while the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor rule. We allow for aggregate shocks to the job separation rate and to the probability
that unemployed workers have low search eﬃciency. The model is computationally very challenging but
we introduce assumptions that allow us readily to analyze its properties using a standard perturbation
approach which may be of an independent interest.
We demonstrate that the model generates a very intuitive amplification mechanism in which the
absence of insurance against idiosyncratic risk implies that an increase in individual job uncertainty -
due to higher risk of job loss and/or longer expected unemployment duration - spurs a decline in goods
demand because it motivates precautionary savings amongst the employed workers.4 The drop in goods
demand in turn leads firms to post fewer vacancies which impacts negatively on the job finding rate.
This interaction produces the amplification mechanism because employed workers increase their savings
even further when perceiving higher job uncertainty due to the drop in probability of finding a job should
they lose their current job. We simulate a calibrated version of the model in response to the short burst
in the rate of inflow to unemployment observed in the U.S. at the onset of the Great Recession and to
a shock to the risk of becoming a low search eﬃcient unemployed worker. The latter shock is estimated
2Ahn and Hamilton (2014) and Hornstein (2011) investigate the importance of duration dependence and heterogeneity
for the increase in unemployment during the Great Recession.
3Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima (2012) and McKay and Reis (2012) also study models that combine incomplete
financial markets and nominal rigidities. The former of these authors examine the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy
while the latter authors look at the impact of automatic fiscal stabilizers. Krusell, Mukoyama and S¸ahin (2010) investigate
the impact of labor market risks on savings in an incomplete markets model with precautionary savings.
4Other recent papers that study the impact of precautionary savings in incomplete markets settings include Challe
and Ragot (2012) and Bayer et al (2013). The latter of these papers also introduces nominal rigidities and allows for
time-varying variance of idiosyncratic earnings shocks while we model uncertainty through employment risk and through
the risk of low search eﬃciency during unemployment.
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imposing a Cobb-Douglas matching function and assuming that variations in the matching function
residual derive from changes in the composition of the unemployment pool. Importantly, apart from
the specification of the matching function, this estimate relies only upon our assumptions regarding the
laws of motion of the stocks of employed and unemployed households and is independent of all other
features of the model. We find that, in response to these two shocks, the model produces a rise in the
unemployment rate and a drop in vacancy postings that are very similar to the empirical counterparts
observed during the Great Recession. Moreover, the model is also consistent with the movements along
and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve.
A key insight of our analysis is that it is the combination of frictions in financial, goods and labor
markets that generates the amplification mechanism. When households can insure against idiosyncratic
risk, labor market uncertainties have minor impact on aggregate demand because households have no
incentive to engage in precautionary savings against idiosyncratic risk thus eliminating the demand
channel. When prices are flexible, price adjustments eliminate the transmission of shocks from the
demand side to the supply side. If wages are fully flexible, the wage adjustment is suﬃcient to neu-
tralize the amplification mechanism unless workers have little bargaining power. We also demonstrate
that monetary policy plays an important role. In standard New Keynesian models that rest on the
representative agent assumption, aggressive changes in nominal interest rates in response to deviations
of inflation from its target can eliminate the ineﬃciencies deriving from nominal rigidities. Aggressive
monetary policy also stabilizes in the heterogeneous agents economy that we examine because it neu-
tralizes the amplification mechanism due to its impact on aggregate demand. This result demonstrates a
new important stabilization role for monetary policy absent from the representative agent based models
upon which much of the monetary economics literature is based.
Our analysis is related to the rapidly growing literature on ‘uncertainty shocks’ that has followed
Bloom’s (2009) contribution. The absence of unemployment insurance contracts implies that variations
in the probability of job loss and in the job finding rate impact on agents’ perception of idiosyncratic
risk. However, whilst much of the existing literature has emphasized the impact of changes in second
moments of aggregate shocks, we stress the eﬀects of changes in the first moments of job separation and
job finding rates which trigger demand variations because of the their impact on idiosyncratic risk.5 An
interesting aspect of this is that uncertainty is partially endogenous and rises in recessions when the job
finding rate typically is low. We show that these uncertainty eﬀects may be of first-order importance
5Basu and Bundick (2012) and Schaal (2012) also investigate the impact of uncertainty and news shocks in models with
labor market frictions but concentrate on changes in second moments of aggregate shocks.
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in a macro setting when combined with frictions in goods and labor markets.6
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the labor market impact of
the Great Recession. In Section 3 we present the model. Section 4 examines the quantitative properties
of the model and provides an analysis of the Great Recession. Section 5 provides some robustness
analysis. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Great Recession and the Labor Market
The financial crisis produced one of the longest and deepest recessions in U.S. history. According to
the NBER, the contraction lasted 18 months (December 2007 - June 2009), the longest since the Great
Depression. The Great Recession also triggered a major deterioration of labor market conditions.7
The unemployment rate rose from 4.7 percent in July 2007 to 10 percent by October 2009, and has
subsequently remained stubbornly high, see Figure 1. The increase in unemployment witnessed during
this episode is large but not out of line with previous U.S. recessions. In the early 1980’s recession, for
example, the unemployment rate peaked at 10.8 percent and the OPEC I recession saw it rising to 9
percent. However, compared to other recessions, the rise in unemployment has been very stubborn and
7 years after the onset of the recession, the unemployment rate is still well above its pre-recession level.
The flows in and out of unemployment provide a useful way to gain some further insight into the
determinants of the change in unemployment. We measure the average instantaneous job finding rate,
p , and the average job separation rate, p as:
p =
m
u−1
p =
e
n−1
where u is the level of unemployment, n the stock of employment, m the flow of workers from
unemployment to employment, and e the number of (permanent) job separations. All data were
obtained from the Current Population Study (CPS) apart from e which we got from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Figure 2 illustrates p and p. The initial rise in unemployment was triggered by a rapid increase in
the unemployment inflow rate in the period from early 2008 to late 2009. However, the persistence of
6Leduc and Liu (2013) provide time-series evidence that changes in ‘uncertainty’ impact on aggregate demand and
argue that labor market risks are important determinants of risk.
7See Daly et al (2011), Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2010), Hall (2010), Katz (2010), and Rothstein (2011) for excellent
discussions of the labor market during the Great Recession.
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the rise in the level of unemployment derives from a large and stubborn decline in the unemployment
outflow rate which drops dramatically during 2009 and since recovers only marginally. Thus, the main
issue that needs explaining is how the recession produced such a large and persistent drop in the job
finding rate and this is one of the main targets of the model that we construct in Section 3.
A key aspect of the labor market impact of the Great Recession is the surge in the incidence of longer
term unemployment. Figure 3 illustrates the time-series for the share of unemployed workers who have
been out of work for 6 months or more. In the postwar sample prior to the Great Recession, the share
of longer term unemployed displays moderately countercyclical movements with its highest level of 26
percent occurring in the early 1980’s recession. During the Great Recession instead, this indicator of
longer term unemployment surged from 17.5 percent in August 2007 to 45.3 percent in April 2010 and
it still hovers well above 30 percent, see also Rothstein (2011) and Wiczer (2013).
The data suggest that the rise in longer term unemployment is related to increased heterogeneity of
job finding prospects amongst the unemployed. Perhaps the simplest way of seeing this is to compare
the average duration of unemployment with the inverse of the instantaneous job finding rate. Suppose
that the job finding rate is constant within a month and that all unemployed face the same probability
of finding a job. In this case the law of motion for average duration of unemployment, d, can be
formulated as:
d =
³
1− p
´
(d−1 + 1)
u−1
u
+ p
n−1
u
(1)
In the non-stochastic steady-state d = 1p where p is the long-run value of the job finding rate.8
Thus, under the assumption of homogenous search eﬃciency, the average duration of unemployment
in the data should be close to the inverse of the instantaneous job finding rate unless there are large
shocks to the flows in and out of unemployment.
Figure 3 illustrates the time-series of average unemployment duration in the United States together
with the inverse of the average instantaneous job finding rate and the estimate of average unemploy-
ment duration derived from (1). The inverse job finding rate tracks the BLS estimate of the average
unemployment duration very closely until the Great Recession. From the end of 2007, however, the
two graphs deviate very significantly and the BLS estimate of unemployment duration rises approxi-
mately twice as much as the inverse of the job finding rate. This result indicates either measurement
error, and/or the impact of large shocks and/or that there is heterogeneity in the search eﬃciency of
the unemployed. We can check for the importance of large shocks by drawing a comparison with the
8To see this note that d =

1− p p + pp (nu) and that nu = pp.
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estimated unemployment duration derived from (1). This estimate is essentially identical to the inverse
of the job finding rate. Thus, we conclude that the increase in duration observed in the U.S. during the
Great Recession requires one to allow for heterogeneous job finding prospects and/or consider sources
of measurement error. We will concentrate on the first of these.
Another much discussed feature of the Great Recession is its impact on the Beveridge curve. Figure 4
illustrates the relationship between vacancies and unemployment using CPS estimates of unemployment
and JOLTS estimates of the number of vacancies. We discriminate between the pre-Great Recession
period and the period thereafter (from 2007:12). During the early parts of the recession, unemployment
approximately doubled while the number of vacancies fell by around 50 percent which jointly produced
a striking movement down the Beveridge curve. In the course of the initial part of the recession, the
labor market conditions worsened considerably but the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies appear
consistent with the pre-crisis Beveridge curve. From late 2009, however, there is instead evidence that
the Beveridge curve shifted outwards, indicating a less eﬃcient matching between workers looking for
employment and firms looking for new hires, see also Barlevy (2011).
We take away from this that the persistent decline in the job finding rate is key for understanding the
large and persistent decline in unemployment during the Great Recession, that the increase in average
unemployment duration is related to an increase in heterogeneity amongst the unemployed, and that
there have been substantial movements along the Beveridge curve followed by an outward shift in this
relationship. We will construct a model and ask whether it is consistent with these observations and
whether the labor market weaknesses may have been a key factor behind the severity of the recession.
3 Model
We consider a heterogenous agents economy with frictions in financial, labor and goods markets. The
economy consists of households, firms owned by entrepreneurs, and a government which is in charge of
monetary and fiscal policies.
Households. There is a continuum of mass 1 of households indexed by  ∈ (0 1). Households are
risk-averse, infinitely lived, and maximize the expected present value of their utility streams.
A household is either working or unemployed. Employed households (indexed by  = ) earn a real
wage w but lose their current job with probability ρ ∈ [0 1]. Unemployed households search for jobs
and receive unemployment benefits ξ  w. There are two types of unemployed households which diﬀer
in their search eﬃciency and therefore in their job finding probabilities, η. Unemployed workers with
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high search eﬃciency ( = ) face a shorter expected unemployment spell than unemployed workers
with low search eﬃciency ( = ), 0 ≤ η ≤ η ≤ 1. Upon job loss, a newly unemployed worker enters
the high search eﬃciency pool with probability ϕ ∈ [0 1], and the low search eﬃciency pool with the
complement probability ϕ = 1 − ϕ. Moreover, during an unemployment spell type  unemployed
workers risk making a transition to type , an event that occurs with probability ω ∈ [0 1]. The
model therefore includes two sources of heterogeneity in job finding rates, ‘unobserved heterogeneity’
and negative duration dependence both of which imply that workers who have been unemployed for
longer periods on average have lower job finding rates than newly unemployed workers.9
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the aggregate labor market shocks are
realized. After this, unemployed workers and firms with job vacancies match and new employment
relationships are established. This is followed by production and consumption. At the end of the
period, job separations are eﬀectuated. Thus, employed workers face idiosyncratic uncertainty about
the identity of job losers and about their search eﬃciency should they lose their jobs. By the same
token, unemployed workers face idiosyncratic risk about the identity of current and future job finders
and high search eﬃciency unemployed workers also risk making a transition to low search eﬃciency.10
Households cannot purchase unemployment insurance contracts. Consumption smoothing is accom-
plished through government provided unemployment benefits and through self-insurance by saving in a
riskless nominal bond, b. Households maximize utility subject to the following borrowing constraint
and sequence of budget constraints:
b ≥ bmin  ≥ 0 (2)
c + b = nw + (1− n) ξ + R−11 + πb
−1  ≥ 0 (3)
where bmin is a borrowing limit, c denotes a consumption basket, R−1 is the gross nominal interest
rate, π denotes the net inflation rate in period . n indicates the household’s employment state:
n =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if individual  is employed in period 
0 if individual  is unemployed in period 
Let V
¡
b  rS
¢
be the expected present discounted utility of a household given its bond holdings,
its labor market status, r, and the aggregate state vector, S. The Bellman equation for an employed
9See also Barnichon and Figura (2012), Hornstein (2012), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krusell et al (2009), for models
with multiple unemployment states.
10Of course, households also face idiosyncratic uncertainty about the identity of future job losers.
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household is given as:
V
³
b  S
´
= max
cb0
{U (c) + βE
⎛
⎝1− X
=
ρϕ
¡
1− η0
¢⎞⎠V³b0  S0´
+βEX
=
ρϕ
¡
1− η0
¢
V
³
b0  S0
´
} (4)
subject to the borrowing constraint and to the budget constraint in equation (3) setting n = 1. U is
an increasing and strictly concave utility function. β ∈ (0 1) is the subjective discount factor, and E is
the conditional expectations operator. The terms on the right hand side of (4) are (i) the instantaneous
utility flow U (c), (ii) the probability of being employed next period (1 −P= ρϕ ¡1− η0¢) times
the continuation value of being employed, and (iii) the probability of being state  unemployed next
period (ρϕ
¡
1− η0
¢
) times the respective continuation values.
The Bellman equation for a type  unemployed worker is:
V
³
b  S
´
= max
cb0
{U (c) + βE (1− ω)
h
η0V
³
b0  S0
´
+
¡
1− η0
¢
V
³
b0  S0
´i
+βEω
h
η0V
³
b0  S0
´
+
¡
1− η0
¢
V
³
b0  S0
´i
} (5)
subject to (2) and (3) setting n = 0. A type  unemployed worker remains type  with (1− ω) and in
that case finds a job with probability η0, and makes a transition to type  with probability ω and then
finds a job with probability η0. This last transition incorporates the possibility of negative duration
dependence.
Finally, the Bellman equation for a type  unemployed workers is given as:
V
³
b  S
´
= max
cb0
{U (c) + βE
h
η0V
³
b0  S0
´
+
¡
1− η0
¢
V
³
b0  S0
´i
} (6)
subject to (2) and (3) setting n = 0.
The two Bellman equations (5) and (6) diﬀer because the two types have diﬀerent job finding
prospects and because only type  unemployed workers face the risk of making a transition to a less
eﬃcient search state. As a matter of consistency, we assume that V ¡b S¢ ≥ V ¡b S¢ for all b
and S so that no employed household has an incentive to voluntarily leave their current job. Under the
condition that η0 ≥ η0, V
¡
b S¢ ≥ V ¡b S¢ for all b and S.
The consumption index c is a basket of consumption goods varieties:
c =
µZ

³
c
´1−1 ¶1(1−1) (7)
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where c is household ’s consumption of goods of variety  and   1 is the elasticity of substitution
between consumption goods. Household ’s demand for variety  is given as:
c =
µ
P
P
¶−
c (8)
where P is the nominal price of variety  and P is a price index:
P =
µZ

P1− 
¶1(1−)
(9)
Entrepreneurs. Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of measure Ψ  1 of monopolis-
tically competitive firms indexed by  ∈ (0 1) which are owned by risk neutral entrepreneurs. Entre-
preneurs discount utility at the rate β and make decisions on the pricing of their goods, on vacancy
postings, and on their consumption and savings policies. In return for managing (and owning) the firm,
they are the sole claimants to its profits. We assume that entrepreneurs can save but face a no-borrowing
constraint. This no-borrowing constraint implies that the entrepreneur finances hiring costs through
retained earnings.11
Entrepreneurs make all their decisions simultaneously but we can separate them into the hiring and
pricing decisions made when acting as firm owners and the consumption and savings choices made when
acting as households. Output is produced according to a linear technology:
y = n (10)
where n denotes entrepreneur ’s input of labor purchased from the households. Firms hire labor in
a frictional labor market. The law of motion for employment in firm  is given as:
n =
¡
1− ρ−1
¢
n−1 + h (11)
h = ψv (12)
where h denotes hires made by firm  in period , v is vacancies posted, and ψ is the job filling
probability. Firms are assumed to be suﬃciently large that ψ can be interpreted as the fraction of
vacancies that leads to a hire.12 The cost of posting a vacancy is given by μ  0. Real marginal costs
are therefore:
mc = w +
μ
ψ − βE
∙
(1− ρ) μψ+1
¸
(13)
11 In the stationary equilibrium,   1 ( ((1 + ))) so entrepreneurs will be borrowing constrained. This derives from
the assumption that households are risk averse while entrepreneurs are assumed risk neutral.
12This assumption - which is equivalent to assuming that Ψ is suﬃciently smaller than 1, can be relaxed which would
produce ex-post heterogeneity across firms.
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Following Rotemberg (1982), firms face quadratic costs of price adjustment. Given risk neutrality,
entrepreneurs set prices to maximize the present discounted value of profits:
E
∞X
=0
β
Ãµ
P+
P+
−mc+
¶
y+ − 
2
µ
P+ −P+−1
P+−1
¶2
y
!
(14)
subject to:
y =
µ
P
P
¶−
y (15)
Equation (15) is the demand for goods variety . y, can be interpreted as aggregate real income. In
equation (14)  ≥ 0 indicates the severity of nominal rigidities in price setting with  = 0 corresponding
to flexible prices. The first-order condition for this problem is given as:µ
1−  + mc P
P
¶
y =  P
P−1
µ
P −P−1
P−1
¶
y
−βE
"Ã
P+1
P2
!µ
P+1 −P
P
¶
Py+1
#
(16)
The entrepreneurs’ consumption and savings decisions are the solutions to the following dynamic
programming problem:
W
¡
b n S
¢
= max
d b0 h
©
d + βW ¡b0 n0 S0¢ª (17)
subject to the employment transition equation and the budget and borrowing constraints:
d + b0 +wn +μhψ =
P
P
n −T + R−1
1 + πb
 (18)
b0 ≥ 0 (19)
where d denotes entrepreneur ’s consumption and b0 their bond purchases. Condition (19) imposes
the no-borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs. T denotes a lump-sum tax imposed on employers to
cover the government provided unemployment benefits.
Labor Market. We assume that w = w as long as w is consistent with the joint match surplus being
non-negative and with workers preferring to work rather than being unemployed.13 Since we focus on
the impact of a recessionary shock, this assumption amounts to assuming that real wages are downward
inflexible, an assumption that squares well with the U.S. experience during the Great Recession. We
will later investigate the importance of this assumption.
13We have checked that the match surplus is positive for all matches in all the results that we report.
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Unemployed workers searching for job and firms with vacancies are matched according to a Cobb-
Douglas technology. The matching technology is given as:
m =  (u) (v)1− (20)
wherem denotes the measure of matches at date , and v is the aggregate measure of vacancies posted
by the firms.   0, and  ∈ (0 1) are constant parameters. u is a measure of the number of eﬀective
(‘active’) searchers at the beginning of the period:
u =
¡
(1− ω−1)u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1
¢
+ q
¡
u−1 +
¡ω−1u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1¢¢ (21)
where u is the measure of type  unemployed workers at date . q ∈ (0 1] is the probability that a
type  unemployed worker is searching for a job at date  and is an indicator of relative search eﬃciency.
When q  1, type  unemployed households face longer expected unemployment spells than type 
unemployed households.
The job filling probability and the job finding probabilities are given as:
ψ = θ− (22)
η = θ1− (23)
η = qη (24)
where θ = vu denotes labor market tightness. The laws of motion of the stocks of employed and
unemployed workers are given as:
n =
¡
1− ρ−1
¢
n−1 +m (25)
u =
¡
1− η
¢ ¡
(1− ω−1)u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1
¢
(26)
u =
¡
1− η
¢ ¡
u−1 +
¡ω−1u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1¢¢ (27)
Government. The government is in charge of monetary and fiscal policies. We assume that the
government balances the budget period-by-period:
uξ = ΨT (28)
where u = u + u.
Monetary policy is specified by a rule for the short-term nominal interest rate:
R = R
µ
1 + π
1 + π
¶
(29)
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where R is the long-run nominal interest rate target, π is the inflation target, and  denotes the (semi-)
elasticity of the nominal interest rate to deviations of inflation from its target.
Stochastic Shocks. We allow for shocks to the job separation rate, ρ, to ϕ, the stochastic variable
which determines the share of job losers who flow into the two types of unemployment, and to ω which
determines the probability of search eﬃciency loss an unemployment spell. We assume that:
ρ = ρ+ z (30)
ϕ = ϕ + z (31)
ω = ω + z (32)
z = λz−1 + ε (33)
z = λz−1 + ε (34)
z = λz−1 + ε (35)
where ρϕω ∈ (0 1) determine the steady-state values of the stochastic variables and λλλ ∈
(−1 1) their persistence. We assume that ε ∼ N (0V) where ε = (ε ε ε)0. ε is assumed
orthogonal to ε and ε while these two latter shocks may be correlated.
Equilibrium. We focus upon a recursive equilibrium in which households act competitively taking all
prices for given while firms act as monopolistic competitors setting the price of their own variety taking
all other prices for given. In equilibrium, firms will be symmetric because of the absence of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, state contingent pricing and because we assume that they are large enough that
job separation and vacancy filling probabilities can be treated like fractions. We denote relative prices
by p = PP and note that symmetry implies that the equilibrium relative price equals 1 for all
goods. In the symmetric equilibrium, the optimal price setting condition therefore simplifies to:
1−  + mc = π (1 + π)− βE
∙
π+1 (1 + π+1) y+1
y
¸
(36)
As is well-known, models with incomplete markets and aggregate shocks are cumbersome to solve nu-
merically. In this paper we impose that the borrowing constraint bmin = 0. Under this assumption there
is no aggregate savings vehicle available to households and, in equilibrium, all households consume their
income every period. Nonetheless, since employed households face the risk of losing their job, they have
an incentive to save and will therefore be on their Euler equations. The great advantage of imposing this
borrowing constraint is that the aggregate wealth distribution is degenerate, see also Krusell, Mukoyama
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and Smith (2011). The aggregate state vector is then given as S =
¡
uuρϕω
¢
which does
not involve the wealth distribution. This simplifies the computationally aspects very considerably while
it has only limited impact on the aggregate dynamics, see Ravn and Sterk (2012).
We let c
¡
b rS¢ and b0 ¡b rS¢ denote the decision rules that solve the households’ problems
(depending on their labor market status), and h (bnS)  d (bnS) and b0 (bnS) the solutions
to the entrepreneurs’ problem. We can now define the equilibrium formally:
Definition 1 A recursive monopolistic competition equilibrium is defined as a state vector S, pricing
kernels (w (S) π (S)), decision rules ¡c ¡b rS¢ b0 ¡b rS¢¢=  (d (bnS) b0 (bnS) h (bnS))
and p (bnS)=0, value functions
³
V
¡
b S
¢ V ¡b S¢ V ¡b S¢´1=1 and W (bnS), and
government policies (T (S) R (S)) such that
(i) given the pricing kernel, the government policies, and the aggregate and individual states, the house-
hold decision rules solve the households problems;
(ii) given the pricing kernel, government policies, and the aggregate state, the entrepreneur decision
rules solve the entrepreneurs’ problem and p (bnS)=0 = 1 for all  and all (bnS);
(iii) asset, goods and labor markets clear:
0 =
Z

b0
³
b  S
´
+Ψ
Z

b0
¡
b n S
¢  = 0
ey = Z

c
³
b  S
´
+Ψ
Z

d
¡
b n S
¢ 
y =
Z

n 
ey = y − v−φ
2
π2yZ

h
¡
b n S
¢  =  (u) (v)1−
n =
¡
1− ρ−1
¢
n−1 +  (u) (v)1−
u =
¡
(1− ω−1)u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1
¢
+ q
¡
u−1 +
¡ω−1u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1¢¢
u =
¡
1− η
¢ ¡
(1− ω−1)u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1
¢
u =
¡
1− η
¢ ¡
u−1 +
¡ω−1u−1 + ρ−1ϕ−1n−1¢¢
(iv) the government budget constraint is satisfied and the nominal interest is given by the policy rule in
equation (29) ;
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4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Calibration
We solve the model numerically using a standard perturbation approach (see the Appendix for details).
The calibration targets and parameter values are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
One model period corresponds to a calendar month. The household utility function is assumed to
be given as:
U (c) =
c1− − 1
1−    ≥ 0
 is the degree of relative risk aversion which matters for the household savings response to uncertainty.
We set  = 15 which is in the mid-range of empirical estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1995),
Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988), and many others who have examined either household data
or aggregate time series. We assume an annual real interest rate of 5 percent in the steady state and
set the subjective discount factor equal to 0992 for both households and entrepreneurs. This value is
low relative to standard representative agent models but because of idiosyncratic risk and incomplete
markets, agents have a strong incentive to engage in precautionary savings and a low real interest rate
is required to induce zero savings in equilibrium.
When calibrating the parameters pertaining to the labor market we must confront the issue that
the two types of unemployment are not directly observable.14 We address this issue by calibrating the
relevant parameters on the basis of information on labor market statistics that are informative about
the moments of interest. We target a steady-state unemployment rate of 5 percent. The parameters
(qϕω) and the steady-state job finding probability for type  unemployed workers, η, are calibrated
by targeting the following moments: First, according to CPS data for the post 1970 sample, on average
15 percent of job losers experience unemployment spells of 6 months or more. Secondly, the monthly
hazard rate for the newly unemployed is 43 percent, see Rothstein (2011). Third, we introduce in-
formation on duration dependence from Kroft et al’s (2013) estimate of the relationship between job
finding probabilities and the length of an unemployment spell. These authors estimate the job finding
probability of individuals out of work for  months at date  using a polynomial specification for the
hazard. In particular, they assume that the job finding rate depends on the length of the unemployment
14Although type  unemployed workers have shorter expected unemployment spells than type  unemployed workers,
some of the type  unemployed will be out of work for extended periods due to bad luck.
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spell and on labor market tightness as:
η (θ ) = A ()0θ1−
A () = (1− 1 − 2) + 1−1 + 2−2
Using panel data from the CPS for the 2002-2007 sample (and controlling for demographic variables),
Kroft el al (2013) estimate b1 = 0314, b2 = 0393, b1 = 1085 and b2 = 0055. We target the implied
values of the relative hazard, A () A (0), for the values of  going up to 15 months.
We find that q = 0468, ϕ = 0229 ω = 0219 and η = 0586. Thus, the great majority of
job losers (77 percent) flow into the high search eﬃciency state upon job loss and thereafter face a
moderate risk (22 percent per month) of loss of search eﬃciency during unemployment. Unemployed
workers with low search eﬃciency are less than 50 percent as likely to find a job as high search eﬃciency
unemployed workers implying that the unemployment state has a substantial impact on the expected
unemployment duration. In the steady-state, these parameter values imply that the average duration
of the stock of type  unemployed workers is 1.48 months, that the corresponding number for type 
unemployed workers is 4.10 months while the share of unemployed workers out of work for 6 months
or more is 15.9 percent. The calibration matches closely the hazard function estimated by Kroft et al’s
(2013).15 Finally, to match the 5 percent unemployment rate, we set the steady-state job separation
rate (ρ) equal to 3.9 percent per month.
The benefit level, ξ, is calibrated by targeting a decline in consumption of 117 percent upon unem-
ployment, a value which corresponds to Hurd and Rohwedder’s (2010) estimate of the average household
spending impact of a job loss.16 We assume that the matching function elasticity to unemployment, ,
is equal to 65 percent and we normalize  = 1. μ, the vacancy cost parameter, is calibrated by targeting
an average hiring cost of 45 percent of the quarterly wage bill per worker. Given other parameters, this
implies that μ = 021.
We set the average mark-up equal to 20 percent which implies that , the elasticity of substitution
between goods, is equal to 6. , the parameter that determines the importance of price adjustment
costs, is calibrated to match a price adjustment frequency of 5 months. This value is conservative but
consistent with the estimates of Bils and Klenow (2004).17 This implies that  = 969. We assume
15Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the hazard function implied by our model evaluated in the steady-state together
with Kroft et al’s (2013) estimates.
16See http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407.pdf?new_window=1; Table 21. Browning and Crossley (2001) estimate a
similar average consumption loss due to unemployment shocks in Canadian household data.
17To be precise, we calibrate  by exploiting the equivalence between the log-linearized Phillips curve implied by our
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that the government’s inflation target  = 0 so that it pursues price stability and we set  = 15, a
conventional value in the new Keynesian literature.
Finally, we estimate the parameters of the stochastic processes for ρ, ϕ and ω. The persistence
of ρ and the variance of its innovation are estimated using JOLTS data on layoﬀs and the employment
rate from the BLS over a sample ranging from 2003 to 2014.18 We find b = 091 and bρ = 00067.
To estimate the persistence and volatility of ϕ and ω we must again confront the issue that search
eﬃciency is unobserved. However, we can use the model to ‘back out’ processes for these two stochastic
shocks given the above estimate of the relative search eﬃciency, q, the matching function parameters,
 and , and data on the unemployment outflow rate and labor market tightness. It follows from the
matching function that:
u = u−1
µeη

¶1µ v
u−1
¶1−1
(37)
where eη is the average job finding rate amongst the stock of unemployed. We further assume pro-
portionality between ϕ and ω which implies that the disturbances to these two flows are perfectly
correlated and proportional, i.e. zt = zt. Under this assumption, we can use the estimates of u
together with the transition equations (26)− (27) to derive estimates of ϕ and ω, see Appendix 2 for
details, from which we can estimate the persistence and variance of the two shocks. Using data from
JOLTS and the CPS (for the 2003-2014 sample) we find b = b = 099 and bϕ = bω = 0072.19
4.2 Results
The Impact of Labor Market Shocks. We start by examining the impact of job separation shocks
and changes in the composition of unemployed workers brought about by shocks to ϕ and ω. We
compare the results of the benchmark economy with two alternative economies. In the first of these we
assume that prices are flexible ( = 0) but retain the incomplete markets assumption. Comparing the
results of this economy with the benchmark model is informative about the extent to which nominal
rigidities matter for the transmission mechanism. In the second alternative economy we assume individ-
model and the Phillips curve implied by the Calvo model.
18Our analysis focuses on the Great Recession and its aftermath and we choose the sample period accordingly.
19Since the frequency of the data is monthly, measured job openings and layoﬀs are rather noisy. To avoid very erratic
shocks, we pre-smooth the data using a 6 month moving average filter. The parameters of the shock processes are obtained
by regressing the shock variables on their values lagged with one year. We then compute the monthly persistence parameters
that are implied by the regressions.
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ual households can insure against idiosyncratic shocks within large families (but retain the presence of
nominal rigidities) which is useful for understanding the extent to which idiosyncratic risk is important
for our results. In this alternative economy there is risk sharing within the family so consumption is
equalized across household members independently of their labor market status. The family therefore
maximizes utility subject to the single budget constraint:
c + b = nw + (1− n) ξ + R−11 + πb
−1  ≥ 0
where n is the fraction of employed household members in period .
Figure 5 illustrates the responses of key aggregate variables to a one standard deviation increase
in the probability of job loss. Variations in the job termination rate have only moderate eﬀects on
equilibrium unemployment in standard matching models because rising unemployment implies declining
job filling costs which triggers higher vacancy postings but we instead find large eﬀects. In particular,
relative to the increase in the job separation rate, unemployment rises a lot in the benchmark economy
and in a very persistent manner which also produces a surge in the share of longer term unemployed
workers.20 Thus, not only do households see the job loss risk rising, but they also experience a worsening
of job finding prospects during unemployment.
Figure 6 repeats the analysis for a joint one standard deviations increase in ϕ and in ω. This
combination of shocks generates a decrease in average search eﬃciency because a larger proportion
of job losers flow into type  unemployment and because a larger share of the existing high search
eﬃciency unemployed workers suﬀer a loss of search eﬃciency. We find that these shocks also produce
a persistent increase in both the level of unemployment and in the share of longer term unemployed
workers. Similarly to the job separation shock, the decline in search eﬃciency leads to a persistent
decline in vacancy postings and in the job finding rate.
In order to understand better the results it is instructive to consider the Euler equation for employed
households and the first order condition for price setting:
U (c) c = βE R
1 + π0 {
¡
1− ρ £ϕ ¡1− η0¢+ (1−ϕ) ¡1− η0¢¤¢ U ¡c0¢ c0
+ρϕ
¡
1− η0
¢ U ¡c0¢ c0 + ρ (1−ϕ) ¡1− η0¢ U³c0´ c0} (38)
1−  + 
µ
w +
μ
ψ − βE (1− ρ)
μ
ψ0
¶
=  (1 + π)π + βE ¡1 + π0¢π0y0
y
(39)
20The increase in job separations produces an initial short-lived drop in the fraction of long-term unemployed workers
because of the inflow of newly unemployed workers.
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where c denotes the consumption level of an employed worker,  is consumption of a high search
eﬃciency unemployed worker and c is the consumption level of an unemployed worker with low search
eﬃciency.
Employed households are on their Euler equation because they have an incentive to save. Increased
risk of job loss (higher ρ) stimulate higher desired savings because it implies lower expected income and
because of increased idiosyncratic employment risk. Declining search eﬃciency (lower ϕ) and worsening
job finding prospects during unemployment (lower η0 or η0) imply longer expected unemployment spells
and therefore also trigger a decrease in expected household income and an increase in idiosyncratic
income risk both of which stimulate savings. Thus, when labor market conditions worsen, employed
households’ demand for consumption goods falls at the current real interest rate.
Equation (39) is the optimal price setting condition in the symmetric equilibrium. When adverse
labor market conditions trigger declining goods demand, firms have an incentive to cut prices but
nominal rigidities imply that it is optimal to phase-in the price adjustment. Condition (39) states that
lower inflation has to be accompanied by lower real marginal costs. Since real wages are assumed rigid,
in equilibrium, the fall in marginal costs is produced by an increase in the job filling probability which
cuts the cost of hiring. Thus, vacancy postings have to fall which explains the persistent drop in the
job finding rate (and the fact that precautionary savings depresses aggregate demand even further)
discussed above. Finally, in response to the decline in inflation, the central bank cuts nominal interest
rates suﬃciently strongly to generate a drop in the real interest rate.
Thus, the model produces a simple and intuitive amplification mechanism in which labor market
shocks trigger declining goods demand which are transmitted to the supply side and produce a fall in
labor demand. It is this transmission mechanism from the demand side to the supply side that produces
amplification because fewer vacancies further depress labor market conditions and therefore stimulate
a further fall in goods demand.21
The transmission mechanism depends crucially on the combination of nominal rigidities in price
setting and on the lack of insurance against unemployment. To see this, Figures 5 and 6 also report the
impact of the labor market shocks for the two alternative economies described above. When prices are
flexible, job separation shocks have little impact on unemployment and lead only to a minor increase in
incidence of longer term unemployment. In this economy, price flexibility neutralizes the need for a fall
21The no-borrowing constraint that we have imposed implies that the real interest rate does the full adjustment but it
should be understood that the transmission mechanism is one in which demand contracts in response to worsening labor
market conditions.
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in marginal costs and firms take advantage of low hiring costs (due to the increase in unemployment) to
post more vacancies. The job finding rate therefore falls only marginally which stops the amplification
mechanism that operates in the benchmark economy. When the fraction of low search eﬃciency unem-
ployed workers increases, it becomes more costly to fill vacancies because the job filling rate declines.
For that reason, this shock leads to a decline in vacancy postings which depresses the job finding rate
and spurs precautionary savings. However, price flexibility once again eliminates the need for a large
decrease in vacancies and there is therefore no amplification of the shock. Thus, even if households
are exposed to idiosyncratic risk, price flexibility implies limited impact of deteriorating labor market
conditions.
When households can insure against idiosyncratic employment shocks through risk sharing within
large families, changing labor market conditions no longer impact on idiosyncratic risk and savings
are therefore determined only by intertemporal considerations. An increase in the job separation rate
impacts little on the household because its eﬀect on expected family income is minor. For that reason,
aggregate demand is rather unresponsive to changes in the job separation rate in the economy with
insurance. The intertemporal savings motive is also small in the case of shocks to the share of low
eﬃciency searchers and the presence of insurance within the family eliminates the precautionary savings
eﬀect. Thus, there is therefore little amplification of labor market shocks when households can insure
against idiosyncratic risk.
In summary, the amplification mechanism that arises in the benchmark economy derives from the
combination of nominal rigidities and the lack of insurance against idiosyncratic risk. Nominal rigidities
produces a channel through which variations in goods demand impact on job creation while the lack of
job insurance implies that changes in job prospects impact on goods demand.
The Great Recession. We now examine the extent to which the mechanisms of the model may be
important for understanding key features of the Great Recession. We derive estimates of the sequences
of the shocks, (ε ε ε)2014:8=2007:1 and we feed them into the model to produce counterfactual experi-
ments. ε is estimated by matching the observed U.S. time-series on the employment-to-unemployment
transition rate while ε and ε are estimated using the same procedure as discussed above when cal-
ibrating the model. In order to avoid having too erratic shocks, we smooth both data series with a 6
months moving average filter. We then feed the resulting shock processes into the model economy and
simulate the economy in response to this particular sequence of shocks.
The upper panels of Figure 7 illustrate the shocks that we estimate for the Great Recession. As
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discussed in Section 2, the Great Recession witnessed a spur of job separations which started in early
2008, peaked in early 2009, and lasted only until the end of that year. The shock to search eﬃciency is
estimated to be much more persistent. We find a steady rise in the share of new job losers that flow into
low search eﬃciency and in the share of high search eﬃciency workers that experience a drop in search
eﬃciency. The drop in the average search eﬃciency starts in 2008 and continues throughout 2009 and
2010 peaking in early 2011 and thereafter slowly diminishes. It is useful to compare this shock to search
heterogeneity with other measures. For that purpose we also illustrate the matching function residual
derived as:
 = log
Ã∙
1

µ
m
u−1
¶¸1µ v
u−1
¶1−1!
which is the matching function residual estimated by an econometrician who (wrongly) assumes ho-
mogeneous search eﬃciency amongst the unemployed. The implied matching function residuals are
very similar to the estimates of Barlevy (2011) and correspond to a 40-45 percent adverse shock to the
matching function over the 2007-2011 period and a 20 percent recovery thereafter. We also illustrate
the fraction of newly unemployed workers who report to be “permanent” job losers. As argued by
Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2013), permanent job losers have lower job finding rates than other types
of job losers and variations in this fraction therefore reflect changes in average search eﬃciency. This
fraction increases from 23 percent prior to the recession in 2007 to 45 percent by early 2010. Thereafter
it gradually declines towards its pre-recession level. It therefore mirrors quite precisely the matching
function residual implied by the shock to the heterogeneity in search eﬃciency that we estimate.
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of the shocks on the level of unemployment, the number unemployed
workers out of work for 6 months or more (relative to the labor force), and on vacancies. In Section 2
we argued that the large drop in the job finding rate and its very slow recovery thereafter are key for
understanding the severity of the Great Recession. A prime aspect of our analysis is therefore whether
the model can account for this response of the job finding rate to the two labor market shocks just
discussed. The answer to this is aﬃrmative: Not only does the model reproduce the timing and the size
of the fall in the job finding rate, but it is also consistent with the very persistent nature of the declining
job finding prospects. Moreover, we find that the model accounts very closely for the adjustments in
unemployment and vacancies. As in the U.S. data, the level of unemployment surges in 2008 while the
number of vacancies implodes. Thereafter the increase in unemployment dissipates only very slowly over
time while vacancies recover slightly faster. The results demonstrate that the amplification mechanism
discussed in the previous sections is quantitatively important.
Figure 8 also reports the share of longer term unemployed (the number of unemployed workers out
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of employment for 6 months or more as a share of the total number of unemployed). This share soared
during the recession increasing from 15 percent prior to the recession to above 40 percent during 2010-
2012. The benchmark economy is consistent with the rise in the incidence of longer term unemployment
in the early part of the recession and with the very stubborn nature of the rise in this labor market
indicator. The model, however, is not fully able to account for the size of the rise in the incidence of
longer term unemployment since the peak in the share of longer term unemployed workers in the model
economy is just below 30 percent which is smaller and occurs earlier than in the U.S. data. Nevertheless,
the model does generate a significant shift in the composition of the unemployed towards unemployment
states with longer duration.
Finally, the bottom left panel of Figure 8 displays the conditional standard deviation of income one
month ahead for currently employed workers, scaled by the current level of income.22 This is a measure
of the income uncertainty in the model which partly is endogenous as it depends on the job finding
rate. We find that income uncertainty surges during 2008 and remains at an elevated level until 2013,
after which it decreases somewhat. Recall that there is little amplification of the shocks in the flexible
price model. Therefore, by comparing with the corresponding measure in the economy without nominal
rigidities we can evaluate the endogenous component of this uncertainty measure. We find that income
uncertainty rises significantly less in the flexible price economy than in the benchmark model especially
in the early part of the recession (the rise in income uncertainty by early 2009 is almost twice as large
in the benchmark economy as in the flexible price version of the model). It follows that the model
produces an important endogenous and countercyclical source of income uncertainty.
Combining the implications for the impact of the labor market shocks on unemployment and on
job vacancies produces the Beveridge curve illustrated in Figure 9. In the U.S. economy, there was a
rapid slide down the Beveridge curve in the early part of the recession followed by an outward shift
of this relationship and a gradual recovery in both indicators. Such counter-clockwise Beveridge curve
movements are not unusual during recessions but the current episode is more dramatic than what is
observed during most other recessions. We find that the model accounts very accurately for both the
movement down the Beveridge curve that occurred in 2008-2009 and the subsequent outward shift of
the Beveridge curve.
One might wonder about the extent to which job separation shocks and shocks to the search eﬃciency
matter individually for these results. To understand this, Figures 8 and 9 also display the paths of the
22To compute the conditional standard deviations we use a Gauss-Hermite approximation with 36 nodes. We do not
plot the uncertainty measure for the full insurance version of the model, as it is close to zero throughout the sample.
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relevant aggregates when we assume that the U.S. economy was hit only by job separation shocks. In
the absence of shocks to the flows of workers to the two search eﬃciency states, the model can account
for the initial rise in unemployment in late 2008 and for the initial drop in vacancies. However, the
shocks to search eﬃciency are key for understanding both the size and the persistence of the rise in
unemployment and for the very long and deep decline in job vacancies. In addition when we exclude
the shocks to ϕ and to ω, the model produces only a very minor increase in the share of longer term
unemployed workers and little change in income uncertainty post 2010. This demonstrates that an
increase in heterogeneity amongst the unemployed is important for accounting for both the severity of
the Great Recession and for surge in the incidence of longer term unemployment.
We can go further in understanding the mechanisms by examining the results when eliminating
frictions in goods or financial markets. When we assume that prices are flexible, the labor market
shocks leave vacancies almost unaﬀected. For that reason, the worsening labor market conditions have
a much smaller impact on unemployment than in the data and lead to a very minor rise in the incidence
of longer term unemployment. Perhaps most strikingly, the flexible price model implies an extremely
counterfactual horizontal Beveridge curve. Interestingly, the model with insurance against idiosyncratic
shocks generates very similar results to the flexible price model. The labor market shocks have minor
impact on aggregate goods demand in this economy and for that reason firms have little incentive to
post fewer vacancies in the wake of the worsening labor market conditions. The end result is a limited
increase in unemployment, a minor increase in the incidence of longer term unemployment, and a very
counterfactual horizontal Beveridge curve.
We make two observations. First, the amplification mechanism derives from the combination of
frictions in goods, labor and financial markets. Focusing on each of these frictions in isolation may
not be informative about the joint eﬀects and this potentially explains why past research has concluded
against the importance of labor market shocks for macroeconomic fluctuations. Secondly, whilst we have
introduced shocks to the extent of heterogeneity in search eﬃciency, these shocks as such do not account
for why the theory’s success in accounting for the increased incidence of longer term unemployment since
they have little impact when assuming either lack of idiosyncratic risk or fully flexible goods prices.
5 Extensions and Robustness Analysis
In this section we investigate three further issues. We first analyze further the sources of heterogeneity in
search eﬃciency amongst the unemployed. Next, we examine the importance of the downward inflexible
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wage assumption. Finally, we look at how the monetary policy response matters for the amplification
mechanism.
Search Eﬃciency Heterogeneity: Amplification vs. Propagation. An important feature of
our model is the heterogeneity in search eﬃciency amongst the unemployed. It is this aspect of the
model that allows us to address the substantial increase in the incidence of longer term unemployment
which has occurred during the Great Recession. Above we also argued that this feature is important
for accounting for the magnitude of the increase in unemployment and for its persistence.
Our analysis allows for heterogeneity in search activity to materialize either upon job loss or during
an unemployment spell (due to negative duration dependence). These two sources of heterogeneity in
search eﬃciency play distinct roles. Heterogeneity in job search eﬃciency upon job loss impacts on
employed households’ consumption and savings decisions directly, cf. the Euler equation (38). When
employed workers perceive higher risk of flowing directly into the low search eﬃciency state should
they lose their job, they increase their desired precautionary savings. Increased risk of loss of search
eﬃciency during an unemployment spell instead impacts on the average job finding rate but does not
directly influence employed households’ savings choices and is therefore not directly important for the
amplification mechanism. Negative duration dependence instead may act as a propagation mechanism
through which temporary increases in the number of job losers has persistent eﬀects because the pool
of newly unemployed workers risk experiencing a loss in their search eﬃciency during an unemployment
spell.
We now wish to understand the extent to which the two flows separately have been important for the
labor market dynamics during the Great Recession. Figure 10 repeats the Great Recession experiment
from the previous section under two alternative scenarios. In the first of these we assume that the
probability of search eﬃciency loss during an unemployment spell, ω, remains constant during the
Great Recession and equal to its steady-state value of ω = 219 percent per month. This experiment
informs about the importance of changes in the two sources of heterogeneity for the labor market
outcomes. In the second experiment we set ω = 0 so that negative duration dependence is eliminated
and all heterogeneity in search eﬃciency occurs upon job loss.
We find that the path of the economy generated when assuming ω = ω is very similar to the one in
which we allow for both sources of changes in the extent of heterogeneity. This similarity relates both
to the share of longer term unemployed workers and to the level of unemployment. Thus, increased
heterogeneity in job finding prospects upon unemployment is quantitatively much more important than
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increased negative duration dependence. This result derives from the impact on precautionary savings
discussed above and it is consistent with the findings of Ahn and Hamilton (2014) who - studying
CPS data - find that recessions are times when there is an increased inflow of workers with low job
finding probabilities into unemployment. Our results go one step further and demonstrate that such
a compositional change is important for the severity of the Great Recession because of its impact on
aggregate demand.
We also find only a moderate eﬀect of eliminating negative duration dependence altogether (ω = 0)
which indicates that the propagation mechanism that derives from workers experiencing a loss of search
eﬃciency during an unemployment spell is rather limited. The reason for this is that our calibration
implies that type  workers find jobs quite fast (within 1.5 months on average in the steady-state) and
face a quite small risk of a loss of search eﬃciency. Indeed, in the steady-state a type  unemployed
worker only faces a 13 percent risk of experiencing a transition to state  during an unemployment
spell. This risk is too small to matter much quantitatively. It follows that in the setting we examine,
heterogeneity in search eﬃciency upon job loss is much more important for macroeconomic outcomes
than negative duration dependence.
The Role of Wage Flexibility. We have assumed that real wages are downward inflexible. This
assumption appears consistent with Figure 11 which shows that while the average real compensation
per hour worked in the Business Sector grew by approximately 25 percent from the mid-1990’s to the
beginning of 2007, real wages have remained unchanged since the onset of the Great Recession. We
will now ask two questions: First, to which extent do our results depend on this rigidity? Secondly, are
there circumstances under which a lack of a fall in real wages may arise as an equilibrium outcome?
In order to investigate these issues we assume that wages are determined according to a non-
cooperative Nash bargaining game between firms and workers. We assume that in new matches, once
workers and firms have been matched (but before a wage has been agreed upon), a worker enters the
two unemployment pools with probability ϕ and 1 − ϕ, respectively, in exactly the same manner
as a worker who enters unemployment from an existing match.23 This assumption combined with the
borrowing constraint, makes the outcome under Nash bargaining particularly simple because the wage
oﬀered to a new worker is independent of their unemployment state.
We report results for a wide range of values of the workers’ bargaining power which includes both
23Alternatively, one can assume that workers retain their unemployment status but in this case the equilibrium would
entail one-period wage dispersion which seems unreasonable.
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Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) calibration of workers receiving 5 percent of the match surplus to
‘traditional’ values of this parameter of 50 percent. Figure 12 illustrates the impact of a job separation
shock on unemployment and on real wages. We report the maximum increase in unemployment relative
to the corresponding value in the benchmark model. Similarly, we show the maximum decline in the
real wage as a percentage of the steady-state real wage.24
We find that higher bargaining power on the part of workers implies higher wage flexibility in
equilibrium and a significantly smaller maximum response of unemployment. For example, when workers
and firms have the same bargaining power, the maximum response of unemployment is less than 25
percent of the corresponding response in the benchmark economy. Low values of the workers’ bargaining
power instead imply similar responses to labor market shocks to those we found when assuming inflexible
real wages.
To understand these results, consider the impact of an increase in the job separation rate on the joint
surplus. A higher job separation rate lowers the value of a filled job because it increases the probability
that an existing match is terminated. It also lowers workers’ outside option because of its impact on
the job finding rate. Hence, the joint match surplus declines and this puts a downward pressure on real
wages which relieves the pressure on firms to cut vacancy postings. The higher (lower) the workers’
bargaining power, the larger (smaller) is the fall in real wages and the smaller (larger) is the decline in
vacancy postings. Whether the increase in job separations impact mostly on real wages or on vacancy
postings matters for employed households’ savings choices because the former of these have no impact
on the precautionary savings motive since it has no idiosyncratic risk component. For that reason, the
amplification mechanism is neutralized when workers have a large bargaining power but not for low
values of this parameter.
As we have noted above, real wages did not decline much, if at all, during the Great Recession.
The results presented here imply that this may either be consistent with workers have little bargaining
power or with real wages are downward inflexible. These two alternative scenarios have very similar
implications for equilibrium quantities and would therefore be diﬃcult to disentangle empirically.
The Role of Monetary Policy. It is standard intuition in the monetary economics literature that
aggressive responses of nominal interest rates to inflation can neutralize the ineﬃciencies that derive from
nominal rigidities while too weak responses to inflation produce locally indeterminate equilibria. It is
24We assume that workers enjoy leisure when unemployed and calibrate the utility value of leisure so that the steady-state
equilibrium real wage implies a 5 percent unemployment rate.
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unclear whether similar results should be expected to hold in the heterogenous agents model considered
in the current paper but the strength of the amplification mechanism implies that the monetary policy
response may potentially be very important.
In order to investigate this issue, Figure 13 reports the impact of job separation rate shocks on
unemployment as a function of two key parameters,  and .25  determines the response of the
nominal interest rate to deviations of inflation from its target while  determines the extent to which
households respond to employment risk. We indicate by diﬀerent colors the amplification of the labor
market shocks in the benchmark economy by normalizing the maximum impact on unemployment of
the job separation shock with the equivalent response in a flexible price economy. A dark blue color
means no amplification relative to the flexible price economy with lighter shades of blue and yellow
and orange colors indicating ever increasing degrees of amplification. The white area corresponds to
combinations of  and  that are inconsistent with local determinacy of the equilibrium where inflation
is on target.
We find that suﬃciently aggressive monetary policy rules succeed in neutralizing the amplification
mechanism while interest rate rules similar to those typically assumed in the New Keynesian literature
instead produce a large amount of amplification. In our calibration ( =  = 15), both shocks are
significantly amplified but increasing  to around 2 neutralizes much of the amplification relative to
the flexible price allocation. More aggressive of monetary policy responses provide stabilization by
moderating the agents’ expectations regarding the impact of the shocks on equilibrium inflation and
vacancy postings and thus impact directly on the mechanism through which labor market shocks are
amplified.
Our results also show that higher degrees of risk aversion demand more aggressive policy rules in
order to provide stabilization and that, the higher is the degree of risk aversion, the more aggressive
has the interest rate rule to be in order to ensure local indeterminacy of the intended equilibrium.
These features derive from the impact of risk aversion on precautionary savings. When agents are
more risk averse, there is a stronger impact of labor market uncertainty on precautionary savings which
motivates the need for a more aggressive monetary policy stance in order to stabilize the economy.26 In
the indeterminacy region, equilibria can exist in which agents’ expectations of worsening labor market
25The results for mismatch shocks are nearly identical so we do not report them here.
26 also impacts on the determinacy region in standard New Keynesian models, see e.g. Gali (2008), but only because it
impacts on the response of consumption to real interest rates. In our model, a more important source of impact is through
precautionary savings.
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outcomes and low inflation drives down aggregate demand thereby motivating firms to hire less labor
and leading the economy to a high-unemployment-cum-low-inflation self-fulfilling equilibria. Thus, the
design of the monetary reaction function is critical in the incomplete markets set-up analyzed in this
paper.
6 Conclusions and Summary
We have shown how frictions in labor markets that interact with goods and financial markets frictions
can lead to a significant amplification of labor market shocks in a general equilibrium framework. At the
heart of our theory is the idea that labor market shocks that produce job uncertainty trigger households
to engage in precautionary savings thereby impacting on the level of aggregate demand. A calibrated
version of the model can account not only for the increase in unemployment observed in the U.S. during
the Great Recession but also for much of the movements in the Beveridge curve. It is the transmission
of weak aggregate demand to aggregate supply that produces these results because of an endogenous
amplification mechanism.
Our emphasis on job uncertainty deriving from idiosyncratic employment risk and uncertain out-
comes of labor market search oﬀers an additional route through which macroeconomic uncertainty can
impact on the economy. Much recent literature has focused upon uncertainty shocks deriving from
changes in the volatility of aggregate variables (such as TFP or policy related variables) and shown that
such uncertainty can be important for understanding aggregate fluctuations, see e.g. Bloom (2009). As
Carroll and Dunn (1997) we have instead focused on the idiosyncratic uncertainty implications of first
moment shocks to job loss and job finding probabilities. We plan in future work to further examine the
importance of this channel using micro level data on consumption and labor supply.
Our theory has abstracted from aggregate savings and we imposed that households cannot go into
debt. These assumptions are appealing from a computational perspective but it would be interesting
to relax them both so that one can also evaluate the impact on aggregate savings and investment. It
would also be interesting to investigate the impact of unemployment insurance policies. Unemployment
insurance duration is usually extended during U.S. recessions and the Great Recession is no exception
to this. Our exercise does take this into account because we focus entirely upon recessions and the
calibration of the level of benefits targets Hurd and Rohwedder’s (2010) estimates of the consumption
loss due to unemployment shocks during the Great Recession. Yet, it would be of interest to investigate
further how such cyclical variations in unemployment benefits impact on the aggregate outcomes. We
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plan to pursue each of these issues in future work.
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7.1 Appendix 1: Solving and simulating the model
From the no-borrowing constraint it follows that, in equilibrium, the individual workers’ consumption
levels are given as c = c = ξ and c = w. We can then reduce the model down to a core dynamic
subsystem of only three equations: the household’s Euler equation for bonds, Equation (38), the firms’
pricing condition, Equation (39) and the monetary policy rule, Equation (29), which can be written as:
w− = βE R
1 + π0 {
¡
1− ρ £ϕ ¡1− η0¢+ (1−ϕ) ¡1− η0¢¤¢w−
+ρϕ
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1− η0
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We use this dynamic system of three equations, together with the exogenous shock processes, to solve
for the equilibrium laws of motions of η, R and π using a standard perturbation method.27 We can
then simulate these variables for a given time path of the exogenous shocks.
Simulations of the remaining variables are obtained using the original nonlinear equations. Given
a simulation for η, R and π and the shocks, we can use Equations (22)-(23) directly to obtain
simulations for θ and ψ. Next we jointly use Equations (20)-(21) and (25)-27) to recursively find
the simulation paths for m, u, n, u and u given initial conditions for u and u. To find
the time path for vacancies and the unemployment rate, we use the condition that v = θu and
u = 1 − n. The average job finding rate is computed as mu−1+−1n−1 . Finally, a simulation for
the share of unemployed for 6 months or less is obtained by recursively keeping track of the mass of
unemployed in each of the two states by duration, ranging from 1 to 6 months.
7.2 Appendix 2: Retrieving shocks from the data
We retrieve the search eﬃciency shocks z and z from the data using an iterative accounting
procedure based on only the model’s labor market transition equations and the matching function.
Importantly, the values of the shocks are found independently of the model solution for η, r and π
Thus, key features of the model’s amplification mechanism such as the degrees of price stickiness, risk
aversion and market incompleteness have no impact on the values of the shocks we retrieve from the
data.
27This is done after substituting out  = q in the Euler equation and exploiting that the term y0y drops out under
a first-order approximation of the model around a steady- state with  = 0.
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Our procedure is based on three data series: (i) the civilian unemployment rate from the BLS, (ii)
the layoﬀ rate from JOLTS, and (iii) the number of job openings from JOLTS. The first step is to
retrieve a time series for the number of active searchers, u, from the data. To this end, we re-write
the matching function, Equation (20), as:
m = 
µ
u
u−1
¶
(u−1) (v)1− 
and note that
³
u
u−1
´
is the time-varying residual of an aggregate matching function that abstracts
from heterogeneity. Thus, a by-product we obtain a time series for the aggregate matching function
residual and the shocks we back out map exactly into this residual.
To proceed, we rearrange the above equation to obtain an expression for u:
u = u−1
µeη

¶1µ v
u−1
¶1−1
where eη ≡ mu−1 = 1−u−(1−−1)(1−u−1)u−1 . Given time series for u ρ and v we can evaluate the entire
right-hand side of the above equation. For consistency with the model’s steady state, we take the log
of both sides of the equation and subtract the mean, which gives:
bu = bu−1 + 1 beη + (1− 1) (bv − bu−1)
where a hat denotes a log deviation from the mean.28 We then construct a time series for the fraction
of active searchers as u = u+u  where u is the steady-state level of active searchers in the model.
Given u we can compute the job finding rate among searchers in each period:
η = mu
= eηu−1u
which also gives a time series for η = qη. Next, we back out the shocks using the following iterative
procedure:
1. Start at  = 1, initializing u0 and u0 are at their steady-state levels.
2. Using our proportionality assumption ω = (ωϕ)ϕ and ϕ−1 = 1−ϕ−1 re-write equation
(21) to obtain an expression for ϕ−1 :
ϕ−1 =
u − u−1 − ρ−1n−1 − qu−1
− (ωρ)u−1 − ρ−1n−1 + q (ωρl)u−1 + qρ−1n−1
28The scaling’s parameter  drops out of the equation. The matching parameter  is set to 065, to be consistent with
our model calibration.
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Evaluate the right-hand side to obtain ϕ−1, and compute the implied values of ω−1 and ϕ−1
3. Use Equations (27) and (27) to compute u and u.
4. Set  = + 1 and go back to step 2 until  = 
5. Once the time series for ϕ and ω have been obtained, back out z and z from Equations
(33) and (34).
Our procedure uses data over the period January 2003 until August 2014.
7.3 Appendix 3: The Nash bargaining problem
Under the assumptions discussed in the main text, the Nash Bargaining solution satisfies:
μψ = (1− ) [V (b S)−ϕV (b S)− (1−ϕ)V (b S)] U
0
(w)
where  is the bargaining power of the worker and  is the surplus of a match to an entrepreneur, which
is equal to the (expected) resource cost of hiring a new worker. The term between square brackets on the
right-hand side is the surplus of a match to a household, which equals the diﬀerence between the value
obtained in an employment relationship, V (b S)  minus the expected value outside the relationship,
ϕV (b S) + (1−ϕ)V (b S). The multiplicative term U0(w) on the right-hand side converts the
utility surplus of the employed worker into units of resources using her marginal utility.
To solve the model, we add the Nash bargaining condition to the system of equations, as well as
the worker value expressions, Equations (4)-(6), setting c = w for the employed worker’s value and
c = ξ for the unemployed workers of each type. The latter requirement follows from the borrowing
constraint b ≥ 0 which implies that —as in the baseline model— workers consume their current-period
income streams.
Relative to the baseline model, the system to be solved thus contains four additional equations (value
functions for the three worker types and the Nash Bargaining condition) and four additional variables
(worker values for the three types and the real wage). We solve this model using first-order perturbation
on the entire system of model equations.
7.4 Appendix 4. The Hazard Function
We calibrate∆ = (ϕωqη) by targeting a 15 percent steady-state share of workers out of employment
with a duration of unemployment of 6 months or more, a steady-state monthly job finding probability
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of 43 percent, and the hazard function implied by Kroft et al’s (2013) estimates. These authors estimate
the hiring probability of individuals out of work for  months at date  using a polynomial specification
for the hazard:
η (θ ) = A ()0θ1−
A () = (1− 1 − 2) + 1−1 + 2−2
Using panel data from the CPS for the 2002-2007 sample their estimates are b1 = 0314, b2 = 0393,b1 = 1085 and b2 = 0055. Third, we introduce information on duration dependence from Kroft et
al’s (2013) estimate of the relationship between hiring probabilities and the length of an unemployment
spell. These authors estimate the hiring probability of individuals out of work for  months at date 
using a polynomial specification for the hazard. In particular, they assume that the job finding rate
depends on the length of the unemployment spell and on labor market tightness as:
η (θ ) = A ()0θ1−
A () = (1− 1 − 2) + 1−1 + 2−2
Using panel data from the CPS for the 2002-2007 sample for  going up to 15 months (and controlling for
demographic variables), Kroft et al (2013) estimate b1 = 0314, b2 = 0393, b1 = 1085 and b2 = 0055.
We calibrate ∆ by minimizing the quadratic form:
 = £Σ (∆)−Σtarget¤0 £Σ (∆)−Σtarget¤
where Σ (∆) are the model implied moments and Σtarget are the targets just listed. The minimization
problem delivers the estimates ∆ = (0229021904680586). The figure below illustrates the
implied hazard function along with Kroft et al’s (2013) estimates.
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Figure A.1: Hazard function
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7.5 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Targets and Parameter Values
Targets
0.05 unemployment rate (u)
0.586 job finding rate among searchers (η)
0.045 s.s. hiring cost as a fraction of the quarterly wage ( 4w )
0.15 fraction of long-term unemployed ( 6 months)
0.117 consumption loss upon unemployment ( w )
0 net inflation rate (π)
0.05 annual net interest rate (R12−1)
5 average price duration (in months) in equivalent version with Calvo pricing
Parameter Values
 96.9 price adjustment cost parameter
 6 elast. subst. goods varieties
 0.992 discount factor
 1.5 coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
 1.5 interest rate rule parameter on inflation
ρ 0.039 steady state job termination rate
λ 0.91 persistence parameter termination rate
100νρ 0.667 std. dev. ρ shock as a percentage of ρ
ϕ 0.229 steady state fraction of job losers into -pool
ω 0.219 steady state fraction from -pool to -pool
λ 0.99 persistence of shocks to fraction of job losers into -pool
100νϕ 7.20 std. dev. ϕ shock as a percentage of ϕ
λ 0.99 persistence of shocks to fraction from -pool to -pool
100νω 7.20 std. dev. ω shock as a percentage of ω
μ 0.19 matching eﬃciency parameter
q 0.468 probability of search for unemployed in -pool
w 0.830 real wage
 0.65 matching function elasticity
ξ 0.733 unemployment benefit
R− 1 0.004 steady-state net nominal interest rate
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Table 2: Stationary State Values
Parameter Value Meaning
c 0.830 consumption employed
c 0.733 consumption unemployed in -pool
c 0.733 consumption unemployed in -pool
η 0.586 job finding rate unemployed in -pool
η 0.274 job finding rate unemployed in -pool
u 0.017 mass in -pool
u 0.033 mass in -pool
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Figure 1: The US Civilian Unemployment Rate
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
10
20
30
40
50
60
(%
)
year
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
(%
)
unemployment outflow rate (left axis)
unemployment inflow rate (right axis)
Figure 2: Estimates of Job Separation and Job Finding Rates
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Figure 4: The Beveridge Curve
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Figure 5: The Impact of Job Separation Shocks
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Figure 6: The Impact of Search Heterogeneity Shocks
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Figure 7: The Great Recession: Shocks
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Figure 8: The Great Recession
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Figure 9: Actual and Counterfactual Beveridge Curves: 2007-2014
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Figure 10: The Importance of Diﬀerent Sources of Heterogeneity
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Figure 11: Real hourly compensation
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Figure 12: The Importance of Increased Duration Dependence
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Figure 13: Monetary Policy and Amplification
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